CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 June 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Satish Chandra (India)

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The PRESIDENT: I have pleasure in declaring open the 682nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

We have today on our list of speakers the representatives of Ecuador, Switzerland, Chile and Brazil. I give the floor to the representative of Ecuador, Ambassador Pinoargote.

Mr. PINOARGOTE (Ecuador) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me through you to congratulate the distinguished members of the Conference on Disarmament, since the intelligent and sustained efforts that they have made, particularly as regards negotiations on the CTB, are giving rise to serious expectations and strong hopes concerning an international community that will be able to avoid the horrendous possibility of new nuclear attacks against mankind. The Government of the Republic of Ecuador, particularly encouraged by this situation, has reactivated its request for membership of the Conference on Disarmament, as a reliable and positive demonstration of concrete support for these endeavours.

The Government of my country is particularly interested in participating in the Conference for the following reasons: the negotiation next year of the extension of the NPT and the positions adopted by certain potentially nuclear States; the environmental need to maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing, particularly in the Pacific, so as to avoid pollution of fisheries and other marine resources; the limitation of conventional weapons and the investment of resources in development, particularly given the post-cold-war trend towards low-intensity, low-technology conflicts in so-called third world countries; and avoiding the strong possibility of armed conflicts arising from unresolved border problems in the various regions, fuelled by easily available weapons from former socialist countries.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that Ecuador would be represented at Conference meetings by a high-level technical envoy from the Foreign Ministry, who will not only attend all meetings of the Committee but would constantly monitor this issue in all forums dealing with disarmament at the worldwide, regional or bilateral level. As the Permanent Representative of Ecuador, I have been in touch with the former President of the Conference, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann, with the heads of delegation of some member countries and countries that are in a similar position to ours, as well as with Friend of the Chair, Ambassador Luiz Felipe Lampreia. These interesting discussions have enabled us to confirm that there is a state of stagnation with respect to the expansion of the Conference; consequently, we have also taken note of the idea that has arisen in certain delegations as to the possibility of bringing this matter to the attention of other United Nations bodies, if necessary, although it would be preferable for the Conference itself to shoulder the relevant decision independently. I would also like to place expressly on record that Ambassador Sullivan's list, an excellent contribution that has been overtaken by developments, is not a binding document for the Conference and is not fair to Latin American regional interests, as it maintains the under-representation of the region in an area in which our continent has made major contributions and has maintained constant interest.

(Mr. Pinoargote, Ecuador)

For all the above reasons, Ecuador hopes that there will be an early solution to this stalemate with respect to the expansion of the Conference, as we are convinced that the best way of strengthening and universalizing its achievements is - precisely - by universalizing its membership.

Mr. MOSER (Switzerland) (translated from French): First of all, Sir, allow me to extend to you my delegation's best wishes and its congratulations on taking up the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament.

The war which took place in the Gulf in 1991 created an unprecedented international consensus concerning the fact that an excessive build-up of conventional weapons can have a major impact on the outbreak, conduct and conclusion of an armed conflict. Following this event, a variety of international measures were discussed. Both the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament focus on the question of transparency in the field of armaments. Both, from the outset, have been warmly supported by Switzerland. My Government believes that the accumulation of weapons and military capabilities is the result rather than the cause of the tension between nations. The devising of measures of transparency designed to avoid misconceptions and prepare the ground for cooperative approaches in the field of security is fully in line with the objectives of our security and disarmament policy. Although transparency measures can provide substantial information that was not previously available to most participating States, we none the less believe that this information should first of all pursue political rather than military or analytical aims. The very fact of reaching agreement on relevant elements and parameters is in itself probably as important as, if not more important than, the content of the information exchanged. In the long run Switzerland is expecting the efforts undertaken globally in favour of transparency in armaments to lead to a compilation of information on weapons and military forces which is extensive, useful and significant with respect to regional stability and international security. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an excellent basis for additional progress to be achieved in the field of transparency in armaments. I am convinced that the Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, under the able leadership of Ambassador Wagenmakers, will be able to make recommendations and create a climate conducive to greater transparency and openness. For the United Nations arms register to be capable of serving as a confidence-building measure, the greatest possible number of countries must participate therein. The priority task which must occupy us is thus to convince those who have not yet done so to participate in the Register.

The United Nations Register, as it deals only with arms transfers, covers only a small aspect of what Switzerland considers necessary to accomplish in the field of transparency. In fact, it is not arms transfers which are at the heart of the problem, but rather the effect that they might have in promoting the build-up of major arsenals that threaten the security of other nations. The extension of the Register to military holdings therefore seems to us to be of prime importance; a step of this kind is a key factor for improving the present regime. It is moreover necessary for procurement through national production to be added to present notifications on arms transfers. This type

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of supply is clearly a substitute for imports or other modes of acquiring weapons. I hope that a broad consensus can be reached to extend the Register to military holdings and procurement through national production. In this connection I found the proposals by France (CD/TIA/WP.2 and CD/TIA/WP.9), the United States (CD/TIA/WP.4) and Germany (CD/TIA/WP.13) to be most useful. As to the Russian Federation (CD/TIA/WP.18) and Sweden, they drew our attention to restrictions resulting from legitimate national security concerns.

Suggestions have been made with respect to the standardized form for reporting to the United Nations Register, as well as an adjustment of the seven existing categories. Category VII (missiles and missile launchers), in particular, is far from satisfactory in its present form and should therefore be revised. The creation of new sub-categories should be based not on mere technical parameters but on the distinct function that the weapons featuring in a specific sub-category should clearly have.

Since the Register was established, it has been suggested that new types of weapons should be added to it. We fully support those proposing to include weapons which are of significance from the point of view of international security and regional stability. The risk, however, is that we will overextend the field of the reports, include in them objects of lesser importance and end up with less rather than more transparency. It is essential that the Register should not become an instrument which reflects the views of everyone but satisfies no one.

Information on weapons - which basically deals only with the material dimension of military power - has little significance in itself. Additional information is necessary if we want a more complete picture. Numerous ideas have been voiced on the subject, such as, for example, the lodging of annual declarations on the size and organizations of armed forces (CD/TIA/WP.5). Indications on the military doctrine applied in a given army are other important elements to be taken into account. My delegation would like to come back to these questions in greater detail in the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments.

We fully support other measures which have been mentioned, for example against the arms traffic or the indiscriminate use of land-mines. However, these cannot be discussed properly in a forum responsible for focusing on international security and regional stability. Certain important aspects of transparency in armaments are, by definition, not covered by the Register. The United Nations General Assembly called on the Conference on Disarmament to address, inter alia, the problems of openness and transparency in the field of weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with existing legal instruments. Given its long experience in the field of arms of mass destruction, the Conference on Disarmament is clearly the most appropriate forum to deal with this subject, and I hope that we will have an opportunity to go back into this more deeply in our coming discussions.

Transparency is a means, and not an aim of security policy. Each nation tries to ensure its security by its own means, and that is why expectations differ as to the meaning to be given to transparency measures. More thorough

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consideration ought perhaps to be given to the question of the role of transparency within the broader framework of measures designed to promote security. Of course, this task is not really part of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. On the other hand, each nation participating in the debate implicitly reveals its intentions and its expectations. This happens almost without our noticing it, frequently through statements which seem to be rather technical. This comment also applies to my own statement: the suggestions it contains reflect what my Government intends to do once we have achieved genuine transparency.

In the field of conventional weapons, we do not believe in simple rules based on what was done with respect of weapons of mass destruction, where complete or partial bans are predominant. Regulating transfers of arms and military holdings is different in nature, in so far as these arms are legitimate in themselves, even if they can be used in an illegitimate manner. Given the complexity of the problems raised, which might extend well beyond the traditional areas of arms control and disarmament, it would be a good idea to move forward with a sense of pragmatism both on the bilateral and regional levels and on the international level, in order to find varied and innovative approaches. This growing complexity explains in part why regional approaches are fashionable in post-cold-war security thinking. They make it possible to act directly - and not through the application of general standards - on motivations that lead countries to divert a substantial proportion of their resources to creating huge stockpiles and thereby building up their military power.

I cannot conclude these comments without confirming the deep and ongoing attachment of my country to the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Moser of Switzerland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I would now like to give the floor to Ambassador Berguño of Chile.

Mr. BERGUÑO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me to begin this first statement in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament by expressing my personal appreciation of and the satisfaction of my delegation at your experienced guidance of our discussions. I would also like to record our gratitude for the significant role of your predecessors, Ambassadors Gérard Errera, Wolfgang Hoffmann and György Boytha, and commit my delegation to cooperating with the Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, and all the members of the kind and efficient secretariat.

It is not my intention to effect an analysis encompassing all the issues on which the attention of the Conference is focused. With your agreement I would like to refer in rather general terms to the present situation and the challenges posed for the disarmament process and the strengthening of international security by the major breakdown in the old order characterized by bipolarity, the cold war and the balance of terror. The statement made just six days ago at the International Labour Organisation by the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, is particularly

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instructive, particularly when he reiterates that peace and development are inseparable from one another, since while it is true that there can be no lasting development without peace, neither is peace possible without development. That statement coincides with the submission of the document "Development and international economic cooperation", which expands on the all-embracing view set out in his earlier "Agenda for peace". Even though this latter document does not review disarmament issues, with respect to which he has already expressed his position very eloquently in his message to this Conference and in his statement to the Advisory Board on disarmament, a careful reading of it seems to me to be useful in order to help give our programme of work a sense of direction and of great importance.

The Secretary-General sees the Copenhagen world summit of 1995 as a global social plan at the worldwide level, which strengthens his conviction that the structure of the United Nations should respond to the inherent imperatives of the increasingly inter-disciplinary, coherent and organic activities that it has the task of pursuing. On the basis of these same parameters of inter-dependence of social factors and functionality of the structures through which these are to be channelled, it could rightly be said that the time has come to globalize the disarmament process as well. The Conference on Disarmament, as the competent hierarchical body and central forum for all disarmament issues, should have a configuration in keeping with the process of change, universalization and democratization which the international community is experiencing. It should also broaden its range of subjects, studying in yet greater depth the already diversified agenda which guides our work, directing it towards the conception of disarmament as part of all-round development. On the one hand, disarmament, security and development are phases in an evolution from the age of mistrust to a nascent community of security. On the other, it must also be recognized that disarmament itself is a unitary system, in the realization of which each of the participants has a specific responsibility but we all have a shared responsibility. Unlike the past, in which the major decisions on the fate of peace fell to a limited number of Powers, it is not possible today for a State to undertake any action and justify it under the illusory perspective of its national security viewed as exclusive.

I now wish to try to demonstrate the validity of this systematic approach to disarmament, which to some extent goes beyond your own statement in this forum recently. The premises on which this position is based may be outlined as follows. All disarmament issues should be addressed by this Conference. To attain its goals fully, the Conference on Disarmament must be thoroughly representative. Regional security and disarmament as a regional process are linked to disarmament and global security. All States should justify their policies in the light of the contribution that they make to global security. This global security cannot be exclusively military, but must incorporate all the dimensions of development.

It is a keen aspiration of the members of this Conference that all major disarmament negotiations should be concluded within this forum. The Conference on Disarmament has already demonstrated its importance through the conclusion of the historically significant treaty on the prohibition of

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chemical weapons, which was negotiated and drafted within its forums for proceedings. It also took a decisive step in convening, through its resolution 1212, a negotiating committee on a universal nuclear-test-ban convention. There is a strong school of thought, to which we subscribe, with respect to the desirability of the Convention on biological and toxin weapons also being improved in terms of its verification procedures within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Yet it is inconsistent for the Conference to negotiate universal instruments through a system which has only limited participation, nor is it desirable that, in order to avoid these limitations, recourse should be had to diplomatic conferences which are totally independent of the Conference on Disarmament. Nor is it reasonable to ask the member States of the Convention on biological weapons to transfer their deliberations to the Conference on Disarmament without assuring them of participation on a basis of equality. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has therefore expressed the wish that the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament should succeed in better reflecting the current geo-political situation and appropriately addressing the security challenges of this decade and the next century.

Progress made in given sectors and geographical regions is consolidated if it is translated into contributions to the overall process of disarmament and security. As relevant examples, the Mendoza Agreement, the entry into force of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and, through a meeting of experts held in Buenos Aires at the beginning of the year, the initiation of a system of mutual confidence-building measures, are per se events of universal significance even though they fall into a regional context. To exemplify more concretely this contribution by the Latin American region to the refinement of an overall system of non-proliferation, mention could be made of the effect of the amendment to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which, while entrusting what are known as special inspections to the International Atomic Energy Agency, also contributes to expanding the powers of the Vienna agency by placing such inspections in the context of the entire Tlatelolco monitoring regime and the obligations of its States parties, in terms that go beyond those of the non-proliferation Treaty.

The proposition that national security does not exist in isolation and cannot be invoked to undermine the security of others is one that leads us to take a stand concerning the detonation of a nuclear device which breaches the moratorium and impedes the efforts that this Conference on Disarmament is making to bring about the final cessation of all nuclear tests. The living conscience of peoples rejects the attempt made in these tests to legitimize nuclear weapons, and still more to conceive of them as instruments of force or the threat of force in terms that are incompatible with General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV). For that reason I must associate myself with the statements that the distinguished Ambassador Marín Bosch and other representatives made deploring the decision of the People's Republic of China.

More serious is the attitude of another Government which is threatening to withdraw from the international organization responsible for verification and monitoring of the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy. We all share the desire for a denuclearized and stable Korean peninsula. But no

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country can make the obligations objectively and solemnly entered into before the international community conditional upon the imperatives of its security as it interprets them at a given point in time. Membership of an international organization commits us to respect its rules and for the developing countries the international organizations have always represented a factor of balance and support for our most vital interests, starting with the maintenance of security and the strengthening of peace.

It is fashionable to say that security cannot be exclusively military but must reflect an all-round view whereby environmental, technological, economic and social challenges are properly met with an inter-disciplinary methodology. This aspect must be the subject of particular attention, but at the same time we must not forget that this all-round view starts with a unitary approach to disarmament problems in some areas that I consider it wise to recapitulate. The 1995 conference for the review of the non-proliferation Treaty will succeed in its goals to the extent that the consensus decisions adopted in the Conference on Disarmament with respect to a nuclear test ban satisfy the unmet requirement of article VI of the NPT, settle the controversy over peaceful nuclear explosions once and for all and address, through a universal convention, the concerns of those States that saw the Treaty as merely enshrining an imbalance of power between nuclear and non-nuclear States. The acceptability of a universal non-proliferation treaty will therefore stem not so much from the merits or shortcomings of the present text, which it might not be practicable to reform totally, as from a hard-worn set of parallel agreements giving the non-proliferation regime credibility and genuine content and scope. In that context, the setting out of negative security assurances in an internationally binding form (such as a General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus), the elaboration of a convention to regulate the use of fissile material and prohibit its use for aggressive purposes, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and transparency in the registration and quantitative evaluation of all types of weapon (on which a sensible Argentine initiative includes weapons of mass destruction) are all factors that are inseparable from the success of a genuine international regime for horizontal but also vertical non-proliferation.

This exposé does not contain original ideas but a sincere wish to broaden the horizons of our discussions to some extent and show a sequence that may be decisive for the success or failure of our aspirations. You, Sir, have indicated the importance of expanding the Conference on Disarmament to ensure that a greater and more significant number of countries participate on a completely equal footing in the vital negotiations that are now beginning. Although, as I said at the start of my statement, the expansion of the tasks of the Conference is also an imperative, these two issues are indissolubly linked, and for that reason we are especially grateful to Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil for the efforts he has devoted to this matter in his capacity as a Friend of the Chair.

I conclude by thanking you for this opportunity to express these thoughts and renewing the full cooperation of the delegation of Chile.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Berguño of Chile for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to my predecessors, the secretariat and to myself. I now give the floor to Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil.

Mr. LAMPREIA (Brazil): My delegation is much satisfied with the progress already achieved in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This has undoubtedly been possible due to the energetic, but careful manner in which the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Marín Bosch, has conducted the work of the Committee and to the dynamism of the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski. We are thankful to them all. We very much favour Ambassador Marín Bosch's decision to produce a rolling text before the conclusion of this part of the CD's session.

We are approaching a phase of important definitions and we would like to contribute to the debate with some observations related to verification. First of all I would like to make two considerations, which we believe merit special attention. The first one is that the CTBT cannot be perceived as an isolated instrument, but one which will join existing ones, and hopefully be joined by future ones, such as a "cut-off" agreement, in a broad legal framework which incorporates all understandings related to disarmament, non-proliferation and international security in its more ample terms. This recommends that in the process of elaborating the CTBT and its verification arrangements we do not dissociate ourselves from existing instruments and verification mechanisms. That is why we favour a close relationship with IAEA.

The second comment is that the CTBT is a political instrument wherein the essential values lie in the commitment of States parties. Verification is important inasmuch as it strengthens the confidence generated by the regime. It must be clear, however, that we are not engaged in the elaboration of an instrument where verification becomes an end in itself. Furthermore the existing technical, political and financial constraints do not allow for a foolproof verification system. We must not, therefore, act as if we were pursuing one. We face a situation where the old proverb "the perfect is the enemy of the good" cannot be more suitably applied.

We have opted for a verification approach that essentially relies on experience acquired in the past through the reciprocal monitoring undertaken by a few countries, particularly the declared nuclear-weapon States. This approach is based on the ability to detect and identify several physical phenomena which are directly, and sometimes exclusively, associated with a nuclear explosion. Besides its inherent merits, at that time there were no clear options to detect activities in areas of high sensitivity, which generated continuous suspicion. Besides the experience already gained in the past, this approach has the benefit of being essentially non-intrusive. We must not, however, allow it to make us lose sight of two important elements. First of all, that a nuclear explosion requires a minimum amount of highly fissionable material, which is not readily available and which, to a large extent, is already accounted for through existing verification mechanisms. With the eventual conclusion of a "cut-off" agreement, this element can be of even greater relevance to the verification of a CTBT. Second, it does not

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take into due account the fact that a nuclear explosion, and even more so one from which we intend to derive maximum technical information, requires a carefully chosen and prepared site. The system we are projecting is to have, in theory, a homogenous detection capability, whereas we know, even without taking into account relevant political and strategic considerations, that certain specific locations are more suitable as potential test sites. We can of course mitigate this concern through the appropriate use of on-site inspections or of transparency procedures. We are not advocating a revision of the work on verification we have done so far, but having a broader look on this important question and hopefully helping direct some of our future considerations.

We have dedicated most of our efforts in the negotiating process of the CTBT to the establishment of the verification regime of the treaty. We have adopted the basic premise that the international system should be based on two pillars: a continuous monitoring system and on-site challenge inspections. The Group of Scientific Experts has considered the question of seismic monitoring for well over 15 years. We've had a thorough, though by no means exhaustive discussion of the possible techniques to be utilized in the monitoring system. We have already decided to incorporate the seismic technique as the basic monitoring technique. We had an introductory discussion of the question of on-site inspections. In short, we have done a lot of work. There remain several crucial points to be decided, but we already have the basic requirements to start drafting and to tackle some of the pending issues which call for political negotiations.

The first point that we must now address relates to the development of the monitoring network. We believe that a process of natural selection of the techniques required for the non-seismic monitoring system has taken place, as made evident by the comparative attention given to each one. It indicates that we should start drafting the provisions for the utilization of a radionuclide network and should give a detailed technical consideration, examining the technical requirements of each station, as well as their number and geographical distribution. The further work of the GSE will help in our assessment of the possible need for hydroacoustic stations to supplement the detection capacity of the seismic network. Other techniques are not to be ignored, and further work can be carried out, but they are not to be seen as essential or sine qua non conditions for the future regime.

A point which my delegation believes requires additional technical consideration relates to on-site inspections. We have given a closer look to challenge inspections, though my delegation is still unclear about several points. We believe we have to examine in more detail the question of differing degrees (and costs) of challenge inspections. We also believe that sporadic technical audit missions might have to be undertaken by the technical secretariat to assure the reliability of the monitoring stations. They could also be envisaged in relation to the utilization of national stations providing information to the system. We would need further examination of this issue. Many political decisions to be made, such as the procedure for triggering a challenge inspection, depend on an adequate assessment of these questions.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

Another matter which has to be examined more closely relates to the utilization of existing technical means relevant to the verification of a CTBT, including those available on a national and on a multilateral basis. We believe this possibility should be fully explored. We must be aware, however, that the utilization of technical data provided through national technical means poses the question of their technical and political reliability. This is a delicate question which will require further consideration. We must not however part from the concept that the verification regime must rely on unbiased and independent data. Several procedures of a technical and political nature can be envisaged to contribute to the increased reliability of such information, among which I would cite its more transparent use, the possibility that it be examined by an intergovernmental body of the future organization prior to any executive action being undertaken, and the possible opening of stations to occasional multilateral audits.

The use of data obtained from outside sources, national or multilateral, also raises the question of the degree to which the technical secretariat of the future organization should process and analyse information. Much has already been said on this matter. We believe that positions are not really that far apart. We accept that the technical secretariat should not have a political decision-making role. That applies to assessment of information and of compliance. On the other hand, it should have full technical capacity to process and analyse the raw input information received and to condense it into a compact readable form. This applies to information obtained from the seismic and other monitoring systems of the organization. The secretariat also has to be able to analyse technical information received from national technical means. The information to be routinely provided to member States should consist of this compact understandable form. Obviously interested member States can have any and all information made available to the secretariat through its network.

In order to be able to perform these tasks we envisage the need for the intergovernmental deliberative organs of the organization to provide the technical secretariat with long-term political directives or criteria related to the assessment of data received. This is important to avoid overemphasizing conjunctural political criteria.

We are exceedingly concerned with the cost of the verification regime and favour a compact organization with close technical ties with IAEA. We believe we already have enough information to be able to consider the question of the relationship of the future CTBT organization with IAEA. We know IAEA does not have the technical means to carry out the verification package we are designing for the CTBT. But then, no other multilateral organization does. On the other hand, we believe that the future organization would have immediate gains from the utilization of IAEA infrastructure, both physical and human. We also believe there are important reciprocal benefits for the verification itself. This applies to cross-information beneficial to safeguards and to CTBT verification, on a mutually reinforcing mechanism. Furthermore, with the advent of a "cut-off" agreement the increased information would enhance even further the cumulative gains. We would not favour the establishment of an entirely new organization unrelated to IAEA.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

We understand that several actions and decisions related to the administration of the CTBT may require specific decision-making intergovernmental bodies, distinct from those of IAEA. We believe this could be solved along the lines of what has already been done in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has as its own organization OPANAL, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. OPANAL has a General Conference, open to all States parties, a Council, which undertakes the routine decision-making and supervises the verification system of the Treaty, and a small secretariat. The verification is done through IAEA. In the case of the CTBT the technical arrangements could be either the setting up of a specific unit dedicated to CTBT verification within IAEA or an agreement between both organizations specifying the procedures to be followed and the services and facilities to be rendered by IAEA. We tend to favour the first option, but we agree that final decision has to await further developments of the verification regime and a more precise definition of the scope.

The PRESIDENT: This concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I would now like to turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the concerned ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, if there is no objection, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Just on a practical matter, to say that the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances will indeed be held this afternoon at 3 p.m., in room V.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you for that clarification. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting, but before doing so, I would like to remind you that, immediately following this plenary meeting, Ambassador Kamal will hold his first round of informal open-ended consultations during this session on improved and effective functioning of the Conference and, in accordance with past practice, that meeting will be open to non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 23 June 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.